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of the government as measured by governance and legal origin positively influence 
both financial sector size and efficiency. The size of the government proxied by 
government expenditure and the government ownership of banks has a negative effect 
on financial sector efficiency, and a positive impact on financial sector size, 
particularly in the low income economies. 
JEL Codes:  O11, O16, O43, O57 
Keywords: financial sector size, financial sector efficiency, government size, 
government efficiency, government ownership of banks, governance, legal origin, 
cross country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
1.         Introduction 
Since the seminal work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
which examines the relation between a country’s legal origin and  investor protection, 
there has developed a growing literature on law, governance and finance. La Porta et 
al. conclude that countries with English Common law origin provide the highest  
investor protection while countries with French law origin provide investors with the 
least protection. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) examine the association 
between legal origin, initial endowment and financial development. They show that 
both legal origin and initial endowments are important in determining institutional 
structure that contribute to financial sector development. Levine (1998, 1999) 
investigating the relation between legal systems and financial sector development 
concludes that countries with superior creditor protection directives have better 
developed financial systems.  
 
Since the work of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) there has developed a growing 
consensus on  the positive link between  financial sector development and  economic 
growth. This positive relation has been supported in the work of King and Levine 
(1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), Beck, Levine and Loayza (1999), Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1996), Cooray (2009 b) among others. Arestis and Demetriades 
(1995) show that the relationship  between finance and growth  may reflect differences in 
institutional structure between economies. In a similar vein, Chinn and Ito (2005) argue 
that countries with a higher degree of legal/institutional development are in a better 
position to benefit from financial liberalization.   
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Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) in a study that provides a comprehensive database on 
the government regulation of banks, conclude that government ownership of banks is 
negatively associated with bank performance and stability. Similarly, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) demonstrate that increased government 
ownership of a banking system can negatively impact upon financial sector 
development and economic growth. Andrianova, Demetriades and Shortland (2008)  
examining the relation between government ownership of  banks, institutions and 
financial development emphasise the importance of institutions for financial sector 
development. They argue that while the government sector can establish banks to 
jump start economies with very low institutional quality, governments should build 
institutions that promote private sector banking. The present study is closely related to 
these studies that investigate the relation between the government and financial sector. 
 
The distinction between this study and the previous literature is that it differentiates 
between two dimensions of the government, namely, size and quality, and investigates 
their impact on two dimensions of the financial sector, specifically, size and 
efficiency. The government plays an important role in the provision of financial 
services, particularly, in the developing world. Even in the developed economies 
where government ownership of the banking system is relatively lower than in the 
developing economies, the government takes responsibility for regulating the private 
sector and ensuring that outcomes are within acceptable bounds. If governments 
attempt to increase their market power, financial sector development maybe 
constrained due to the disincentive effects of taxes, increased rent seeking and the 
crowding out effect on private investment. For example, the provision of private 
credit by a banking system could be low due to large government expenditures, an 
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inefficient legal system or a corrupt bureaucracy. Similarly, interest margins and 
overhead costs could be high due to inefficient political institutions. The size and 
quality of the government are therefore inextricably linked to the size and efficiency 
of a financial system. Consequently, the size of the government is proxied by: (1) the 
government ownership of banks (see Barth, Caprio Jr. and Levine (2001), La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer (2002));  and (2) government expenditure as in Barro 
(1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996), 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2000), Cooray (2009 a). The quality of the government is 
measured by: (1) legal origin as in La Porta et al. (1998); and (2) the level of 
governance using the dataset compiled by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006). 
Using the dataset of Kaufmann et al. a composite governance index is constructed, 
which is  then used to identify four levels of governance – very high, high,  low, very 
low (see Cooray 2009 a). Ranking the countries by their level of governance this way 
enables investigating the differential impact of each level of governance (government 
quality) on financial sector size and efficiency. This is another aspect in which the 
present study differs from the previous literature. This study focuses specifically on 
the banking sector of the countries under study, rather than the stock market. This is 
because, the banking sector comprises a large proportion of the financial sector in 
most countries in the sample. Given the heterogeneity of the countries in the sample, 
the regressions are also estimated by grouping the countries by income distribution. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some country 
characteristics.  Section 3 states the hypothesis. Section 4 describes the data.  Section 
5 evaluates the empirical results and Section 6 summarizes the conclusions. 
 
 6
2. Country Characteristics 
Figures 1 and 2 plot bank assets/GDP and lending by banks and other financial 
institutions to the private sector/GDP against the initial (1990) level of per capita 
income. Bank assets/GDP and Lending to the private sector/GDP are averaged over 
the 1990-2005 period. These Figures highlight some interesting observations. While 
there is a positive association between per capita income and these financial sector 
indicators, many countries fall below the fitted regression lines suggesting that 
income alone does not explain financial sector development. 
 
Note:  The regression represented by the fitted line reports a coefficient of 0.16 (Robust SE = 0.06),  N 
= 38,  R
2
 = 0.37 from a regression of  Per Capita Income 1990 on Bank Assets/GDP.   
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Figure 1: Per Capita Income and Bank Assets
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Note:  The regression represented by the fitted line reports a coefficient of 0.19 (Robust SE = 0.05),  N 
= 68,  R
2
 = 0.42 from a regression of log Per Capita Income 1990 on Credit to the Private Sector/GDP 
1990-2005.   
 
A question that arises at this point is, what other factors explain financial sector 
development?   
[Table1, about here] 
 
Table 1 groups the countries in the sample by level of governance: very high, high, 
low, very low (see Section 3 for explanation of classification). Note that the averages 
for the country groups reveal that as the level of governance decreases from very high 
to low that the government ownership of banks increase and the size of the financial 
sector as measured by deposit bank assets/GDP and credit by deposit banks and other 
financial institutions/GDP decrease. Financial sector in/efficiency as measured by 
overhead costs and net interest margins increase as the level of governance 
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decreases
1
. Figure 3 plots the government ownership of banks.  Government 
ownership is highest in the Asian region and countries that belonged to the former 
Soviet Union.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2002). For, Botswana, Nepal, Lesotho, Burundi, 
Ghana, Guyana, Maldives, Luxemburg  from Barth, Caprio Jr and  Levine(2001). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 It should be noted, that some countries have bank based systems (for example, Germany, Austria, 
Panama, Portugal, Bangladesh), while others have market based systems (the US, Sweden, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Malaysia) see Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 1999. The volume of credit disbursed by banks 
and deposits of banks in bank based countries are likely to be higher. 
 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
South Africa
Canada
UK
New Zealand
US
Luxemburg
Netherlands
Denmark
Malaysia
Australia
Singapore
Thailand
Guyana
Botswana
Nepal
Zambia
Sweden
Ukraine
Peru
El Salvador
Philippines
Senegal
Kenya
Russian …
Brazil
Turkey
Germany
Tunisia
Ghana
Dominaican …
Ecuador
Indonesia
Lithuania
Paraguay
Austria
Lesotho
Colombia
Kazakhstan
Jamaica
Tajikistan
Slovania
Romania
Nicaragua
Burundi
Belarus
Moldova, …
Sri Lanka
Slovakia
Maldives
India
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Vient Nam
Iran, Islamic …
China
Figure 3: Government Ownership of Banks
 9
3.         The Hypotheses 
 
Based on the preliminary findings reported in Table 1, this study hypothesises that:  
1) Government sector size affects financial sector size and efficiency. 
2) Government sector quality affects financial sector size and efficiency. 
 
Government sector size affects financial sector size and efficiency 
There are two views associated with government involvement in the financial sector.  
The development view associated with Gerschenkron (1962) and Lewis(1950), and 
the political view associated with Kornai (1979) and Shleifer and Vishney (1994)
2
. 
The development view argues that the government can help overcome market failures 
and promote development through lower costs and increased access to finance, 
particularly in the developing economies. The political view on the other hand, argues 
that the government, by pursuing its own political objectives is subject to conflicting 
interests which can lead to less than optimal outcomes, primarily in economies with 
weak property rights. This in turn can lead to increased inefficiency by way of 
increasing interest margins and overhead costs. The political view is supported in the 
work of La Porta et al. (2002), La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999), Lopez de-
Silanes et al. (1997). A preliminary analysis of the data reported in Table 1 suggests 
that, bank assets to GDP and the volume of credit disbursed by the financial sector 
decreases with the increased government ownership of banks, and that overhead costs 
and net interest margins increase with the increased government ownership of banks. 
Thus, this study goes on to empirically investigate if increased government sector size 
leads to reduced financial sector size and efficiency. 
                                                 
2
 See La Porta et al. (2002) for a discussion. 
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Increased government sector quality leads to increased financial sector size and 
efficiency 
The importance of the role of institutions in economic growth has been emphasised in 
the work of Acemoglu et al. (2008), Barro (1999); investor protection in La Porta et 
al. (1997); governance in Cooray (2007, 2008a).  La Porta et al. (1997), conclude that 
countries in which legal systems provide proper protection to investors against 
expropriation by entrepreneurs, are likely to have larger and better developed 
financial markets. Thus, it can be argued that better institutions, legal systems and 
improved governance can lead to not only to better developed financial markets but 
also more efficient financial systems through the better protection of property rights. 
  
4. Data 
 
The study covers a cross section of 71 countries both developed and developing. See 
Data Appendix for greater detail and sources. The sample is selected so as to capture 
countries at all four levels of governance. However, most data for the very low 
governance group are not available and  these three countries are therefore omitted 
from the empirical estimation. The data are annual and cover the period 1990-2005.   
 
The dependent variables in the study are the financial sector size and efficiency 
variables.  Financial sector size is measured by: (1) the ratio of  deposit banks assets 
to GDP and (2) domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions to the 
private sector as a ratio of GDP. The provision of credit by the banking sector to the 
private sector is also an indicator of the degree of activity of financial intermediaries. 
Financial sector efficiency is measured by (1) the value of  banks’ net interest margin 
to total assets, and (2) banks’ overhead costs  to total assets.  Increased competition in 
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the financial sector should reduce overhead costs and interest margins.  Therefore, if 
these measures are low it would imply increased efficiency and vice versa. These 
financial sector indicators are used by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996), King 
and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1996) among others. All the financial sector 
variables have been averaged over the 1990-2005 period (see data appendix). 
 
The main independent variables are the government size and quality variables. The 
size of the government is measured by: (1) the share of government expenditure to 
GDP and (2) the government ownership of banks
3
. Government expenditure is used in   
Rousseau and Wachtel (2005), Devarajan et al. (1996) as  a proxy for the government  
and the government ownership of banks is used in (La Porta et. al. 2001 and Barth et 
al. 2001). The quality of the government is measured by: (1) legal origin and (2) level 
of governance. La Porta, Lopez De-Silanes and Shleifer (1997) differentiate between 
English, French, German, Scandinavian and Communist legal origin. The present 
study uses the same  legal origin classification.  
 
Classification of Countries by Level of Governance: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(1996) have constructed six indicators of governance – (1) voice and accountability: 
the degree  to which a country’s citizens are able to  participate in the political 
decision making process  (2) political stability and absence of violence:  measures the 
stability of a government to political violence and terrorism (3) government 
effectiveness  measures the capability of a government to implement effective policies 
                                                 
3
 The government ownership of banks are from La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2002). For 
Belarus, Ukraine, Jamaica, Moldova, Botswana, Nepal, Lesotho, Burundi, Ghana, Guyana, Maldives, 
Luxemburg the data are from Barth, Caprio Jr, Levine(2001). Note that in La Porta et al. (2001) the 
government ownership of banks is defined as the ownership of deposits by the government in the 10 
largest commercial and development banks.   In Barth et al. (2001) the government ownership of banks 
is defined as the ownership of deposits by the government in the 5 largest banks. 
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and  maintain credibility (4)  regulatory quality is  the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement  sound policies that encourage  private sector  participation  
(5)  rule of law is  the existence of a good legal system including property rights and 
enforcement of contracts  (6)  control of corruption measures  the degree to which 
public power is diverted from  private gain.  These indicators range from a value of  
-2.5 to +2.5 with higher values corresponding to better governance. 
 
The individual  indicators for the initial year, are averaged to construct an overall 
composite governance index (quality index). This composite governance index ranges 
from a value of -2.5 to +2.5.  Four levels of governance are then identified
4
: 
      
1.5
1.5 0
0 1.5 lo
1.5
very high governance
high governance
w governance
very low governance
θ
θ
θ
≥
> >
> > −
≤ −
          
and countries are divided into groups by level of governance.   
 
The initial level of per capita income is included in the empirical analysis and is 
designed to capture the level of development of an economy.  
 A number of control variables are used to ensure the robustness of the results.  These 
include: 
Share of Private Investment to GDP: As increased government expenditure can 
reduce competitiveness by crowding out private sector investment expenditure, the 
share of private investment to GDP is considered.  The private investment series is 
                                                 
4
 See Cooray (2009a). The composite governance indicator does not take on a value of  above 2 for any 
of the countries in the  sample in 1996.  Many of the developed countries have composite governance 
indicators in the range of  1.5 and 2.  Hence, a composite governance index  of over 1.5  it is labled as 
very high governance.  The initial year for the governance indicators is 1996 as this is the earliest for 
which the governance indicators are available. 
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constructed as in Easterly and Rebelo (1996) by subtracting the public investment 
series from total investment.  
Net Secondary Enrolment Ratio:  is used as proxy for human capital as in MRW. 
Religious Fractionalisation: Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2005) examine the 
relation between culture, law and corporate governance and conclude that the 
formation of laws are determined to a great extent by cultural values. Culture is found 
to be associated with financial sector development also in Stultz and Williamson 
(2003). Therefore the religious fractionalisation measure of (Alesina et al. 2003) is 
employed to capture culture.  Religious fractionalistion rather than religion is used as 
studies find that increased ethnic/religious fractionalisation can impede financial 
sector development (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2003). 
French Colonialism Dummy Variable: Given the importance of legal origin in 
financial sector development and the fact that studies (for example La Porta et al. 
1998) find that French legal origin provide investors with the least protection, a 
colonial dummy variable is created with a value of one assigned to French colonies 
and a value of zero otherwise.   
Latitude: is used as a proxy for geography in several studies (Beck et al. 2003, La 
Porta et al. 2002).  Beck et al. (2003) conclude that countries that are closer to the 
equator have lower levels of financial development to those which are not. Therefore 
latitude is used as a control variable in the empirical analysis that follows. 
 
The equations are also estimated using the instrumental variables (IV) method, to 
correct for any potential endogeneity in the model. Instruments used for IV estimation 
are: the ethnic fractionalisation measure of Alesina et al. (2003) and the population 
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growth rate. These instruments are selected on the basis of She’s partial correlation 
coefficient (1997). 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
The following model forms the basis of the empirical analysis:   
Fit = ν Git  + γlog Yit-1 + xit β + µi + δi +  υιt 
where Fit = financial sector size/efficiency variables  for country i in period t. Git  
denote government size variables. Yit-1 represents the initial level of income. All  
control variables mentioned in Section 3 are captured by the vector xit.  µi  represents 
the set of  legal origin dummy variables and   δi  the  series of governance dummy 
variables. υιt  is a random error term that captures all other variables. 
 
Table 2 presents results for the effects of government sector size and quality on 
financial sector size. Columns (1) – (3) are estimated with Deposit Money Bank 
Assets/GDP as the dependent variable and equations (4)-(6) with Private Sector 
Credit/GDP as the dependent variable. Estimation is initially carried out with the 
initial level  of  per capita income and government sector size and quality variables as 
independent variables. Four dummy variables are defined for French, German, 
Scandinavian and Soviet legal origin with the English legal origin group as the 
benchmark group. Similarly, selecting the very high governance group as the 
reference group, two dummy variables are defined for high and low governance.  As 
mentioned previously, the very low governance group is excluded from the empirical 
estimation due the lack of most data series.  
[Table 2, about here] 
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The variables of key interest are the government sector size and quality variables. The 
results reported in Table 2 indicate that the coefficients on government expenditure 
and government ownership of banks are not statistically significant but positive, 
suggesting that there is some support for the hypothesis that the size of the 
government  positively impacts upon financial sector size. Column  (1) of  Table 2 
indicates that a 10% increase in the government ownership of banks leads to a 2.4% 
increase in bank assets to GDP and column (4) indicates that a 10% increase in the 
government ownership of banks leads to a 1.3% increase in private credit to GDP. 
Column (2) indicates that a 10% increase in government expenditure leads to a 0.10% 
increase in the bank assets to GDP ratio. The government quality indicators measured 
by legal origin show that financial sector development is lower in all regions 
compared to the benchmark group, English legal origin, except for those countries of 
German legal origin.  In column (1) for example, the estimated coefficients on the  
legal origin dummy variables suggest  that the assets to GDP ratio in countries with 
German legal origin is [100(e
0.024
 -1)] ≈  2.42%  higher than in countries with English 
legal origin, and 9.24% lower in countries with French legal origin. The coefficients 
on the French legal origin dummy variables are negative and significant at the 10% 
level and the coefficients on the German legal origin variables are positive and 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The Scandinavian and Soviet legal origin 
dummy variables are not statistically significant. Similarly, the coefficients on the 
governance dummy variables are negative suggesting that financial sector 
development is lower in the high governance and low governance groups compared to 
the reference group which is the very high governance group. The estimated 
coefficients on the  governance dummy variables in column (2) suggest  that deposits 
to assets in countries with ‘high’ governance are  4.5%  lower than in countries with 
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‘very high’ governance, and 11.3% lower in countries with ‘low’ governance than in 
countries with ‘very high’ governance. The coefficients on the governance dummy 
variables are statistically significant implying that governance matters for financial 
sector development. The initial level of per capita income is important for financial 
sector development with these coefficients being statistically significant in all 
equations. 
 
Table 3 reports results for the estimation of  government sector size and quality and 
the initial level of per capita income on financial sector efficiency.  In columns (1)-(3) 
the dependent variable is overhead costs and columns (4)-(6) the net interest margin.  
The initial level of per capita income is statistically significant in all of the equations. 
All legal origin dummy variables except for the German legal origin dummy variables 
are positive in these equations suggesting that overhead costs and net interest margins 
in all of these groups except for German legal origin countries are above that  of the 
English legal origin group. Similarly, overhead costs and net interest margins are 
higher in the high governance and low governance countries compared to that of the 
benchmark group which is, the very high governance group. All of the governance 
variables continue to be statistically significant suggesting that governance is 
important for financial sector efficiency. In column (1),  the estimated coefficients on 
the governance dummy variables indicate that, overhead costs in the ‘high’ 
governance group is  3.15% higher and overhead costs in the ‘low’ governance group 
is 6.4% higher than in countries with  ‘very high’ governance. Note that in contrast to 
the results obtained with regard to government sector size in Table 2, government 
expenditure and the government ownership of banks exert a significant negative 
impact on financial sector quality. Column (2) of Table 3 shows that a 10% increase 
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in government expenditure leads to a 0.07% increase in overhead costs and column 
(5) a 0.08% increase in the net interest margin. The estimated coefficients for the 
government ownership of banks indicate that a 10% increase in the government 
ownership of banks leads to a 0.68% increase in overhead costs in column (1) and a 
0.66% increase in the net interest margin in column (4). The results suggest that 
increases in government expenditure and the government ownership of banks lead to 
increases in overhead costs and net interest margins. 
[Table 3, about here] 
 
Given the statistically significant coefficients on the French legal origin dummy 
variables, in Table 4, the equations are estimated by interacting French legal origin 
with the low governance dummy variable, to investigate if the marginal effect of 
French legal origin is increased when governance is low. The government ownership 
of banks and government expenditure are also interacted with the low governance 
dummy variable to examine if low governance acts to reduce the efficiency of 
government expenditure/ government ownership of banks. Only the French and 
German legal origin variables are included in the estimation  in Table 4 as the other 
legal origin groups were not found to be  significant. As in Tables 2 and 3, the 
coefficients on per capita income are statistically significant in all equations. The 
coefficients on the French and German legal origin dummy variables statistically  
significant consistent with the results obtained above. The governance variables are 
statistically significant at the 5% and 10% demonstrating the importance of 
governance for financial sector development. The coefficients on government 
expenditure and government ownership of banks are significant in equations (3) and 
(4) confirming that increased government expenditure and government ownership of 
banks lead to increased overhead costs and interest margins. The estimates in columns 
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(1) and (2) respectively, for the interaction terms for French legal origin-low 
governance is significant at the 1% and 10%s levels suggesting that the marginal 
effect of French legal origin on deposits/GDP and credit/GDP is reduced when 
governance is low. The interaction term for government ownership of banks-low 
governance is negative and significant in column (2) suggesting that  the effect of 
government ownership of banks on credit /GDP is reduced when governance is low. 
The government expenditure-low governance estimates are significant in columns (3) 
and (4), implying that the effect of government expenditure on overhead costs and net 
interest margins are increased when governance is low. The introduction of the 
interaction terms increase the explanatory power of the equations. 
[Table 4, about here] 
 
 
Robustness Tests 
A number of robustness tests are carried out to ensure that the results are robust, to the 
choice of estimation technique and variables used. In order to account for the 
heterogeneity of countries in the sample, the estimation is also carried out by  
grouping the countries by income distribution.   
Sample Split 
Quah  (1996) shows that cross country studies, by grouping countries at different 
levels of development together could overlook the thresholds of development.  
Therefore the estimation is carried out by dividing the countries into 3 groups by 
income distribution - low income, middle income and high income
5
. For each income 
group the English legal origin group is the benchmark group. For the low income 
group, the high governance group is the benchmark group; and for both the middle 
                                                 
5
 Countries are grouped according to the World Bank classification.  
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income and the high income groups, the very high governance group is the benchmark 
group. The Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method is used to account for any 
correlation of the error terms across the equations. Results are reported in Table 5 for 
financial sector size as the dependent variable.  
[Table 5, about here] 
 
Per capita income is statistically significant in all equations.  The French legal origin 
dummy variables are negative and statistically significant for all three income groups 
suggesting that deposits to GDP and credit to GDP is lower in French civil law 
countries as opposed to British common law countries in all three groups. The 
German legal origin variable is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient 
on government expenditure is positive and significant in the low income group and 
the governance dummy variables are statistically significant in all income groups. A 
10% increase in government expenditure in the top panel  leads to a 2.89% increase in 
bank assets/GDP in the low income group. The government ownership of banks is 
significant at the 10% level for the high income group in the upper panel of the Table. 
 
Table 6 reports results for financial sector efficiency by income distribution. 
[Table 6, about here] 
The benchmark groups are the same as those for Table 5.  However, note that the 
government size variables assume statistical significance for all three income groups. 
Both increases in government expenditure and the government ownership of banks 
lead to increases in overhead costs and interest margins.  In the low income group top 
panel for example, a 10% increase in government expenditure will lead to a 0.35% 
increase in overhead costs and a10% increase in the government ownership of banks 
will lead to a 1.10% increase in overhead costs.  The bottom panel indicates that the 
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net interest margin in the low income French legal origin group is 4.08% higher than 
in the English legal origin group. The net interest margin in the high income group 
with  ‘high’ governance is 1.82%  higher than in the ‘very high’ governance group. 
 
Control Variables 
 
In order to ensure that the results are robust to the choice of variables, this section  
estimates the model with several control variables. The control variables include 
human capital, private capital, a French colonialism dummy variable interacted with 
the low governance dummy variable, the religious fractionalisation index of (Alesina 
et al. 2003) to capture culture and latitude to capture geography. 
[Table 7, about here] 
The overall conclusions obtained above do not change with the incorporation of the 
control variables.  An examination of the control variables show that human capital is 
important for financial sector development.  Interesting is the fact that the religious 
factionalisation variable is statistically significant in columns (2)-(4). Column (2) 
suggests that religious fractionalisation has a negative impact on lending to the private 
sector and columns (3) and (4) that overhead costs and net interest margins rise with 
religious fractionalisation. The French colony dummy variable is statistically 
significant in equations (3) and (4) suggesting the importance of historical factors in 
affecting financial sector development.  The latitude variable is statistically not 
significant. 
 
IV Estimation 
 
Not only may the government influence financial sector development, financial sector 
development may influence the volume of government expenditure channelled 
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towards financial sector development. Therefore, this section estimates the model 
using IV estimation to correct for any potential endogeneity bias in the model and to 
ensure that the results are robust to the estimation method. Government expenditure is 
instrumented using the ethnic fractionalisation measure of Alesina et al. (2003) and  
population growth rate. The instruments are chosen on the basis of Shea’s partial 
correlation coefficient. 
[Table 8, about here] 
The results obtained before are supported with the coefficients on the governance 
variables assuming statistical significance. Only the German legal origin and French 
legal origin dummy variables are incorporated in the estimation given that only these 
legal origin variables were statistically significant.  Consistent with the OLS results 
obtained above, the French and German legal origin coefficients and the governance 
variables are statistically significant.  As before, the results indicate that increases in 
government expenditure and government ownership of banks will lead to increases in 
overhead costs and net interest margins and also increases in deposits/GDP and 
credit/GDP. A Hausman (1978) test is carried out to test for any statistically 
significant difference  between the OLS and IV estimates. There is no evidence of any 
significant difference between the  OLS and IV estimates. The Sargan test (1964) 
suggests that the instruments are valid and that the model is correctly specified.    
 
6.  Conclusions 
This study investigates the effects of government size measured by the government 
ownership of banks and government expenditure, and government quality proxied by 
governance and legal origin on financial sector size and efficiency. The results are 
interesting lending support to the conclusion that both government sector size and 
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quality are important for financial sector efficiency, however, that government quality 
matters more than the size of the government sector for financial sector size. The 
results unambiguously support the argument that good governance is a pre-condition 
for financial sector development – both size and efficiency. The present study shows 
that countries of German legal origin have higher levels of financial development 
compared to English legal origin countries. This result is supported in the work of 
Beck et al. (2001) and Keefer (2005) according to who the German legal system is 
more conducive to financial sector development in comparison to other legal systems. 
Despite that fact that the government size variables are not statistically significant in 
the overall financial sector size estimations, they are positive, providing some support 
for the argument that increased government expenditure and government ownership 
of banks have a positive effect of financial sector size. The size of the government is 
found to have a significant positive effect on financial sector size in the low income 
economies. This is a reasonable conclusion considering that in many developing 
economies, it is the government that sets up banks in unbanked and under-banked 
areas in the rural sector increasing public access to finance. The private sector is 
reluctant to set up in rural areas which increases the role of the government in the 
provision of finance, particularly by way of financing development banks and micro-
finance institutions. It is also important to note however, that the high government 
ownership of banks could be due to low institutional quality, suggesting a greater role 
for institutions to promote development of private sector banking. The conclusion that 
financial sector efficiency falls with increased government sector size and low 
governance is also not unreasonable as the continued subsidization of development 
banks and micro-finance institutions can lead to a lack of competitiveness, and rising 
overhead costs and interest margins. There is also some evidence that an increase in 
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religious fractionalization leads to a fall in credit to the private sector, and increase in 
financial sector inefficiency. Human capital is found to have a positive effect on 
financial sector development. In conclusion, it can be argued that improving levels of 
governance and legal systems in the countries under study are important for 
promoting financial sector development.   
 
Appendix 
Data  Sources: 
- Ratio of Deposit Bank Assets/GDP, Domestic Credit by Deposit Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions/GDP, Banks Net Interest Margin/Total Assets, Banks’ Overhead 
Costs/Total Assets, average over 1990-2005:  from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(1999 updated in 2007) 
- Government expenditure/GDP average over 1990-2005: World Development 
Indicators. 
-  Government Ownership of Banks: Share of the top 10 banks in a country owned by 
the government of that country in 1995 from La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2002);  and the fraction of deposits held by the five largest banks from Barth, Caprio 
and Levine (2001). 
-  Legal origin from La Porta, Lopez-DeSilanes and Shleifer (1997) and Harper and 
Mc Nulty (2008). Four dummy variables are created for French, German, 
Scandinavian and Soviet legal origin with the English legal origin group as the 
benchmark group. 
-  Level of Governance for 1996: composite index calculated from the governance 
indicator database of Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (1996) and four levels of 
governance defined for, very high, high, low and very low governance. Two 
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governance dummy variables are created for high and low governance with the very 
high governance group as the reference group.  The very low governance group is 
excluded from the empirical analysis due to the lack of most data series. 
-  GDP per capita for 1990: Purchasing Power Parity from the World Development 
Indicators. 
-  Share of Private Investment/GDP average over 1990-2005: constructed from 
subtracting public investment from total investment.  Share of public investment to 
GDP and total investment to GDP from the World Development Indicators. 
-  Net Secondary Enrolment Ratio average over 1990-2005: from the Human 
Development Reports. 
-   Religious fractionalisation 2001: from Alesina A, Devleeschauwer A, Easterly W, 
Kurlat S and Wacziarg R (2003).  
-  Colonial dummy variable: Takes a value of 1 if French colony and zero otherwise 
from Freedom House 2008 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2005 (downloaded 
November 2008). 
-  Latitude:  Measure of distance from the equator. Scaled to takes a value between 0 
and 1, with 0 equal to the equator from La Porta et al. (1999).  
-  Ethnic fractionalisation 2001: from Alesina A, Devleeschauwer A, Easterly W, 
Kurlat S and Wacziarg R (2003). 
-   Population growth rate  average over 1990-2005: World Development Indicators. 
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Table 1:  Country Characteristics 
 
 
Country 
 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
Governancea 
 
 
 
 
Legal Originb Government 
Ownership of 
Banksc 
 
Deposit Bank 
Assets/GDPd 
 
 
 
 
Credit by Deposit 
Banks and Other 
Financial 
Institutions/GDPd 
 
 
Overhead Costsd Net Interest 
Margind 
Australia vh English 0.12 - 0.81 0.026 0.020 
Austria vh German 0.50 - 0.87 0.025 0.019 
Canada vh English 0 1.54 0.77 0.024 0.018 
Denmark vh Scandinavian 0.09 1.21 0.42 0.036 0.049 
France vh French 0.17 0.93 0.90 0.044 0.035 
Germany vh German 0.36 3.13 0.92 0.028 0.025 
Luxemburg vh French 0.05 - 0.24 0.010 0.007 
Netherlands vh French 0.09 3.58 1.28 0.010 0.015 
New Zealand vh English 0 1.54 0.54 0.028 0.025 
Singapore vh English 0.13 - 0.95 0.014 0.021 
Sweden vh Scandinavian 0.23 1.29 1.09 0.031 0.027 
UK vh English 0 3.11 0.74 0.023 0.020 
US vh English 0 0.66 1.31 0.037 0.038 
Average Very 
High 
Governance vh 
 
0.134 1.89 0.833 0.026 0.025 
        
Botswana h English 0.20 0.29 0.11 0.055 0.052 
Fiji h English - - 0.30 - - 
Jamaica h English 0.56 0.74 0.28 0.076 0.091 
Latvia h German - - 0.45 - - 
Lithuania h German 0.44 - 0.23 - - 
Malaysia h English 0.10 1.66 0.80 0.016 0.025 
Maldives h English 0.75 - - -  
South Africa h English 0 0.9 0.79 0.036 0.039 
Slovakia h English 0.74 - 0.44 - - 
Slovania h German 0.57 0.66 0.48 - - 
Thailand h English 0.17 1.17 0.68 0.020 0.030 
Tunisia h French 0.37 0.56 0.56 0.019 0.022 
Average High 
Governance h 
 
0.39 0.85 0.465 0.037 0.043 
        
Armenia l Socialist   0.06   
Bangladesh l English 0.95 0.29 0.16 0.022 0.007 
Belarus l Socialist 0.67  0.22   
Brazil l French 0.32 0.55 0.25 0.120 0.120 
Burundi l French 0.63 0.17 0.2 0.332 0.512 
Cameroon l French   0.23 0.047  
Central African 
Republic l 
French 
  0.06   
China l German 1.04  1.14   
Colombia l French 0.53 0.21 0.27 0.083 0.064 
Dominican 
Republic l 
French 
0.39 0.51 0.25 0.065 0.063 
Ecuador l French 0.4 0.26 0.19 0.077 0.072 
El Salvador l French 0.26 0.62 0.24 0.033 0.039 
Ethiopia l English   0.19   
Ghana l English 0.38 0.19 0.03 0.055 0.0710 
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Country 
 
 
 
 
 
Level of 
Governancea 
 
 
 
 
Legal Originb Government 
Ownership of 
Banksc 
 
Deposit Bank 
Assets/GDPd 
 
 
 
 
Credit by Deposit 
Banks and Other 
Financial 
Institutions/GDPd 
 
 
Overhead Costsd Net Interest 
Margind 
Guinea-Bissau l    0.02   
Guyana l English 0.19 0.27 0.30 0.039 0.044 
India l English 0.85 0.48 0.27 0.029 0.030 
Indonesia l French 0.43 1.01 0.262 0.029 0.041 
Iran l French 1.00 0.19 0.301   
Kazakhstan l Socialist 0.56  0.150   
Kenya l English 0.29 0.56 0.291 0.037 0.073 
Lesotho l English 0.51  0.162   
Madagascar l French   0.165 0.033 0.060 
Moldova l Socialist 0.70 0.25 0.300   
Mozambique l French   0.110   
Nepal l English 0.20 0.32 0.111 0.025 0.038 
Nicaragua l French 0.63  0.250   
Niger l French   0.144   
Pakistan l English 0.85 0.36 0.234 0.030 0.029 
Papua New 
Guinea l 
English 
  0.240 0.051 0.042 
Paraguay l French 0.48  0.162 0.064 0.066 
Peru l French 0.26 0.36 0.098 0.105 0.072 
Philippines l French 0.27 0.91 0.294 0.051 0.0420 
Romania l French 0.63 0.25 0.150   
Russian 
Federation l 
 
Socialist 0.32 0.16 0.450 0.04 0.040 
Senegal l French 0.28  0.310 0.067  
Sri Lanka l English 0.71 0.29 0.191 0.047 0.051 
Tajikistan l  0.56 0.09 0.140   
Turkey l French 0.35 0.29 0.138 0.063 0.094 
Uganda l English   0.030   
Ukraine l Socialist 0.26  0.330   
Vient Nam l French 0.99  0.660   
Zambia l English 0.23 0.21 0.070 0.541 0.420 
Average Low 
Governance l 
 
0.52 0.42 0.228 0.083 0.091 
        
Liberia vl English - - 0.081 - - 
Myanmar vl Socialist - - 0.048 - - 
Sudan vl English - - 0.092 - - 
Average Very 
Low 
Governance vl 
 
- - 0.074 - - 
Sources: a- Author’s computation from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006).  See Data Section for 
explanation of how countries are grouped by level of governance. 
b- Legal Origin from La Porta, Lopez De-Silanes, Shleifer (1997) and Harper and McNulty (2008). 
c- Government ownership of banks from La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2002). For  Belarus, 
Ukraine, Jamaica, Moldova, Botswana, Nepal, Lesotho, Burundi, Ghana, Guyana, Maldives, 
Luxemburg  from Barth, Caprio Jr and  Levine(2001). 
d – All financial sector variables are from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999). 
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Table 2:  The Size and Quality of the Government and Financial Sector Size:  
OLS Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent 
Variables 
Deposit 
Money Bank 
Assets/ 
GDP 
Deposit 
Money Bank 
Assets/ 
GDP 
Deposit 
Money Bank 
Assets/ 
GDP 
Private 
Credit/GDP 
Private 
Credit/GDP 
Private 
Credit/GDP 
Log Initial GDP  -0.063 
(0.037)* 
-0.044 
(0.021)** 
- 0.072 
(0.014)*** 
-0.046 
(0.024)* 
-0.049 
(0.028)* 
-0.033 
(0.013)** 
French Legal 
Origin 
-0.097 
(0.054)* 
-0.089 
(0.051)* 
-0.091 
(0.052)* 
-0.052 
(0.030)* 
-0.044 
(0.024)* 
-0.059 
(0.033)* 
German Legal 
Origin 
0.024 
(0.010)** 
0.024 
(0.009)** 
0.023 
(0.007)*** 
0.023 
(0.014)* 
0.052 
(0.014)*** 
0.014 
(0.004)** 
Scandinavian 
Legal Origin 
-0.012 
(0.152) 
-0.014 
(0.126) 
-0.014 
(0.026) 
-0.011 
(0.284) 
-0.018 
(0.189) 
-0.022 
(0.059) 
Soviet  Legal 
Origin  
-0.051 
(0.042) 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
-0.024 
(0.012) 
-0.014 
(0.159) 
-0.019 
(0.124) 
-0.003 
(0.183) 
Government 
Expenditure 
-  0.010 
(0.072) 
0.026 
(0.023) 
-  0.044 
(0.103) 
 0.085 
(0.082) 
Government 
Ownership of 
Banks 
0.246 
(0.253) 
- 0.339 
(0.231) 
0.130 
(0.188) 
- 0.173 
(0.012) 
High 
Governance 
-0.074 
(.023)*** 
-0.046 
(0.023)** 
-0.021 
(0.011)* 
-0.034 
(0.012)** 
-0.022 
(0.012)* 
-0.031 
(0.013)** 
Low 
Governance 
-0.125 
(0.053)*** 
-0.120 
(0.043)* 
- 0.103 
(0.057)* 
-0.112 
(0.051)* 
-0.122 
(0.052)** 
-0.110 
(0.043)** 
Intercept 0.243 
(0.212) 
0.071 
(0.241) 
0.075 
(0.064) 
0.046 
(0.037) 
0.131 
(0.145) 
0.341 
(0.311) 
R
2
 0.62 0.69 0.61 0.49 0.47 0.51 
Note:  Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  ***,  **,  *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. 
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Table 3:  The Size and Quality of the Government and Financial Sector Quality: 
OLS Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent 
Variables 
Overhead 
Costs 
Overhead 
Costs 
Overhead 
Costs 
Net Interest 
Margin 
Net Interest 
Margin 
Net Interest 
Margin 
Log Initial GDP  -0.067 
(0.019)*** 
-0.042 
(0.007)*** 
-0.065 
(0.019)*** 
-0.049 
(0.012)*** 
-0.040 
(0.007)*** 
-0.046 
(0.013)*** 
French Legal 
Origin 
 0.055 
(0.027)** 
 0.023 
(0.013)* 
 0.057 
(0.027)** 
 0.053 
(0.031)* 
 0.044 
(0.025)* 
 0.056 
(0.052)* 
German Legal 
Origin 
-0.068 
(0.032)** 
-0.051 
(0.030)* 
-0.059 
(0.034)* 
-0.066 
(0.034)* 
-0.043 
(0.028) 
-0.052 
(0.035) 
Scandinavian 
Legal Origin 
 0.013 
(0.042) 
 0.003 
(0.055) 
 0.015 
(0.024) 
 0.016 
(0.029)* 
 0.005 
(0.068) 
 0.010 
(0.031)* 
Soviet  Legal 
Origin  
 0.021 
(0.043) 
 0.020 
(0.069) 
 0.023 
(0.024) 
 0.037 
(0.035) 
 0.018 
(0.077) 
 0.021 
(0.023) 
Log 
Government 
Expenditure 
- 0.007 
(0.002)** 
0.020 
(0.011)* 
- 0.008 
(0.002)*** 
 0.065 
(0.038)* 
Government 
Ownership of 
Banks 
 0.068 
(0.038)* 
-  0.068 
(0.036)* 
 0.066 
(0.036)* 
- 0.029 
(0.014)* 
High 
Governance  
 0.032 
(0.012)** 
 0.031 
(0.013)** 
 0.024 
(0.012)* 
 0.031 
(0.012)** 
 0.025 
(0.010)** 
 0.027 
(0.011)** 
Low 
Governance 
 0.066 
(0.036)* 
 0.062 
(0.031)* 
 0.060 
(0.032)* 
 0.028 
(0.013)* 
 0.023 
(0.010)** 
 0.020 
(0.011)* 
Intercept 0.120 
(0.129) 
0.265 
(0.252) 
0.243 
(0.120)** 
0.229 
(0.296) 
0.238 
(0.256) 
0.112 
(0.130) 
 R
2
 0.61 0.47 0.62 0.43 0.40 0.45 
Note:  Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  ***,  **,  *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. 
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Table 4:  Interaction between Government Sector Size and Quality and  
Financial Sector Size and Efficiency: OLS Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent 
Variables 
Deposit Money 
Bank Assets/ 
GDP 
Private 
Credit/GDP 
Overhead Costs Net Interest 
Margin 
Log Initial GDP  -0.065 
(0.035)* 
-0.042 
(0.013)*** 
-0.082 
(0.018)*** 
-0.061 
(0.010)*** 
French Legal Origin -0.036 
(0.021)* 
-0.034 
(0.020)* 
 0.088 
(0.030)* 
 0.111 
(0.040)*** 
German Legal 
Origin 
0.041 
(0.024)* 
0.037 
(0.010)*** 
-0.076 
(0.043)* 
-0.096 
(0.043)*** 
Log Government 
Expenditure 
0.116 
(0.199) 
0.254 
(0.275) 
0.068 
(0.026)*** 
0.096 
(0.040)** 
Government 
Ownership of Banks 
 0.411 
(0.376) 
 0.357 
(0.254) 
 0.072 
(0.016)*** 
 0.064 
(0.009)*** 
High Governance  -0.024 
(0.012)* 
-0.027 
(0.017)* 
 0.035 
(0.016)* 
 0.034 
(0.015)** 
Low Governance -0.094 
(0.058)* 
-0.092 
(0.054)* 
 0.083 
(0.033)** 
 0.042 
(0.019)* 
French Legal  
Origin*Low 
Governance 
-0.078 
(0.019)*** 
-0.072 
(0.045)* 
 0.082 
(0.021)*** 
 0.111 
(0.040)*** 
Government 
Ownership of 
Banks* Low 
Governance 
-0.368 
(0.243) 
 -0.307 
(0.132)** 
 0.100 
(0.061) 
 0.167 
(0.120) 
Log Government 
Expenditure* 
Low Governance 
-0.106 
(0.143) 
-0.274 
(0.285) 
 0.049 
(0.017)*** 
 0.066 
(0.027)** 
Intercept 0.247 
(0.200) 
0.444 
(0.234)* 
0.343 
(0.138)** 
0.133 
(0.144) 
R
2
 0.77 0.84 0.77 0.70 
Note:  Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  ***,  **,  *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. 
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Table 5:  Development in Financial Sector Size by Income Distribution:  SUR 
Estimation 
 Low Income Middle Income High Income 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent Variable:  Bank Assets 
Log Initial GDP  -0.240 
(0.070)*** 
-0.151 
(0.065)** 
-0.229 
(0.063)*** 
French Legal Origin -0.023 
(0.010)** 
-0.020 
(0.011)* 
-0.039 
(0.022)* 
German Legal Origin - 0.065 
(0.035)* 
0.038 
(0.018)* 
Scandinavian Legal Origin - - -0.003 
(0.019) 
Soviet  Legal Origin  -0.023 
(0.019) 
-0.031 
(0.029) 
- 
Log Government Expenditure  0.289 
(0.010)** 
0.011 
(0.219) 
0.004 
(0.257) 
Government Ownership of Banks  0.728 
(0.288) 
 0.603 
(0.304) 
 0.759 
(0.435)* 
High Governance Dummy - -0.042 
(0.023)* 
-0.027 
(0.009)*** 
Low Governance Dummy -0.091 
(0.028)*** 
-0.049 
(0.020)** 
- 
Intercept -0.329 
(0.245) 
0.266 
(0.215) 
-0.134 
(0.121) 
R
2
 0.44 0.58 0.50 
 Dependent Variable: Private Credit 
Log Initial GDP  0.113 
(0.023)*** 
0.097 
(0.024)*** 
0.112 
(0.024)*** 
French Legal Origin -0.076 
(0.033)** 
-0.051 
(0.028)* 
-0.052 
(0.022)** 
German Legal Origin - 0.054 
(0.031)* 
0.019 
(0.051) 
Scandinavian Legal Origin - - -0.009 
(0.063) 
Soviet  Legal Origin  -0.024 
(0.054) 
-0.016 
(0.071) 
- 
Log Government Expenditure  0.064 
(0.037)* 
 0.069 
(0.072) 
 0.065 
(0.080) 
Government Ownership of Banks  0.018 
(0.141) 
 0.003 
(0.131) 
 0.027 
(0.142) 
High Governance Dummy - -0.032 
(0.012)** 
-0.039 
(0.013)*** 
Low Governance Dummy -0.045 
(0.025)* 
-0.092 
(0.037)** 
- 
Intercept -0.108 
(0.348) 
0.034 
(0.339) 
-0.132 
(0.325) 
R
2
 0.43 0.46 0.41 
Note: Standard errors   reported within parenthesis. *, **, ***, significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels  respectively.   
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Table 6:  Financial Sector Efficiency By Income Distribution:  SUR Estimation 
 
 Low Income Middle Income High Income 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent Variable:  Bank Overhead Costs 
Log Initial GDP  -0.041 
(0.007)*** 
-0.047 
(0.006)*** 
-0.041 
(0.006)*** 
French Legal Origin  0.021 
(0.012)* 
 0.028 
(0.016)* 
 0.020 
(0.011)* 
German Legal Origin - -0.024 
(0.014)* 
-0.012 
(0.024) 
Scandinavian Legal Origin - -  0.004 
(0.020) 
Soviet  Legal Origin   0.010 
(0.011) 
 0.009 
(0.010) 
- 
Log Government Expenditure 0.035 
(0.020)* 
0.031 
(0.018)* 
0.034 
(0.020)* 
Government Ownership of Banks  0.110 
(0.050)** 
 0.106 
0.043)*** 
 0.117 
(0.047)*** 
High Governance Dummy -  0.027 
(0.014)* 
 0.023 
(0.013)* 
Low Governance Dummy  0.022 
(0.013)* 
 0.035 
(0.020)* 
- 
Intercept 0.292 
(0.096)*** 
0.368 
(0.088)*** 
0.300 
(0.090)*** 
R
2
 0.53 0.59 0.54 
 Dependent Variable: Net Interest Margin 
Log Initial GDP  -0.035 
(0.008)*** 
-0.038 
(0.007)*** 
-0.035 
(0.007)*** 
French Legal Origin  0.040 
(0.020)** 
 0.043 
(0.025)* 
 0.039 
(0.022)* 
German Legal Origin - -0.021 
(0.012)* 
-0.024 
(0.022) 
Scandinavian Legal Origin - -  0.002 
(0.019) 
Soviet  Legal Origin   0.012 
(0.010) 
 0.011 
(0.010) 
- 
Log Government Expenditure 0.037 
(0.021)* 
0.036 
(0.020)* 
0.037 
(0.020)* 
Government Ownership of Banks  0.067 
(0.035)* 
 0.064 
(0.033)* 
 0.070 
(0.030)** 
High Governance Dummy -  0.017 
(0.010)* 
 0.018 
(0.010)* 
Low Governance Dummy  0.020 
(0.004)*** 
 0.027 
(0.013)* 
- 
Intercept 0.229 
(0.112)** 
0.258 
(0.108)** 
0.226 
(0.106)** 
R
2
 0.42 0.44 0.42 
Note: Standard errors   reported within parenthesis. *, **, ***, significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels  respectively.   
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Table 7:  Estimation with Control Variables: OLS Estimation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent 
Variables 
Deposit Money 
Bank Assets/ 
GDP 
Private 
Credit/GDP 
Overhead Costs Net Interest 
Margin 
Log Initial 
GDP  
-0.141 
(0.123) 
0.031 
(0.044) 
-0.056 
(0.011)*** 
-0.045 
(0.012)*** 
French Legal 
Origin 
-0.065 
(0.035)* 
-0.042 
(0.019)** 
 0.051 
(0.023)** 
 0.037 
(0.020)* 
German Legal 
Origin 
0.045 
(0.028)* 
0.025 
(0.012)** 
-0.025 
(0.018) 
-0.023 
(0.013)* 
Log 
Government 
Expenditure 
 0.027 
(0.083) 
 0.152 
(0.073)** 
0.018 
(0.010)* 
0.020 
(0.011)* 
Government 
Ownership of 
Banks 
 0.045 
(0.054) 
0.046 
(0.040) 
 0.040 
(0.022)* 
 0.041 
(0.018)** 
High 
Governance 
-0.042 
(0.022)* 
-0.045 
(0.025)** 
 0.041 
(0.021)** 
 0.041 
(0.021)* 
Low 
Governance  
-0.055 
(0.035)* 
-0.056 
(0.018)*** 
 0.058 
(0.032)** 
 0.053 
(0.037)* 
Log Human 
Capital  
0.083 
(0.044)* 
0.061 
(0.025)*** 
 -0.032 
(0.018)* 
-0.043 
(0.020)** 
Log Private 
Capital 
0.140 
(0.028) 
0.163 
(0.112) 
0.012 
(0.032) 
0.015 
(0.030) 
Culture 0.412 
(0.417) 
-0.182 
(0.086)** 
0.128 
(0.050)** 
0.139 
(0.057)** 
French Colony 
Dummy 
-0.070 
(0.075) 
-0.054 
(0.055) 
-0.040 
(0.019)* 
-0.044 
(0.026)** 
Latitude 0.056 
(0.045) 
0.051 
(0.046) 
0.043 
(0.036) 
0.042 
(0.041) 
Intercept 1.21 
(1.13) 
0.147 
(0.552) 
0.636 
(0.137)*** 
0.446 
(0.183)** 
R
2
 0.60 0.58 0.67 0.64 
Note: Robust standard errors   reported within parenthesis. *, **, ***, significant at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels  respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38
 
Table 8:  Government Sector Size and Quality and Financial Sector Size and 
Efficiency:  IV Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent 
Variables 
Deposit Money 
Bank Assets/ 
GDP 
Private 
Credit/GDP 
Overhead Costs Net Interest 
Margin 
Log Initial GDP  -0.042 
(0.021)* 
-0.024 
(0.012)* 
-0.030 
(0.011)*** 
-0.040 
(0.010)*** 
French Legal Origin -0.014 
(0.013) 
-0.015 
(0.008)* 
 0.023 
(0.011)*** 
 0.012 
(0.002)*** 
German Legal 
Origin 
0.021 
(0.011)* 
0.015 
(0.010)* 
-0.015 
(0.010)* 
-0.020 
(0.010)* 
Log Government 
Expenditure 
0.107 
(0.101) 
0.123 
(0.119) 
0.028 
(0.011)** 
0.022 
(0.010)** 
Government 
Ownership of Banks 
 0.204 
(0.202) 
 0.122 
(0.126) 
 0.039 
(0.010)*** 
 0.025 
(0.018)* 
High Governance -0.025 
(0.011)* 
-0.022 
(0.012)* 
 0.024 
(0.014)* 
 0.026 
(0.011)* 
Low Governance -0.060 
(0.022)*** 
-0.035 
(0.010)*** 
 0.044 
(0.022)* 
 0.039 
(0.015)** 
Hausman Test: p 
value 
 
0.15 
 
0.20 
 
0.21 
 
0.19 
Sargan  statistic: p 
value 
0.20 0.19 0.15 0.21 
Intercept 0.101 
(0.112) 
0.212 
(0.202) 
0.121 
(0.125) 
0.121 
(0.119) 
R
2
 0.75 0.82 0.75 0.74 
Notes: Robust standard errors  reported within parenthesis. *, **, ***, significant at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively.  Instruments used for IV estimation:  ethnic fractionalisation and the population 
growth rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
